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Abstract 
The Bretton Woods institutions were founded in 1944. The World Bank would function as a development tool and the IMF 
would operate as a mechanism to prevent a new economic recession similar to that of the 1930s. As their main objective was to 
maintain global economic stability, they would work directed towards a dual role. The most important one was the diagnosis of 
creeping crises and their prevention, while the other was the direct and effective intervention in crises, when these could not be 
prevented. 
 Over the years, the objectives of the institutions changed and their operation does not correspond to the formation of 
modern reality. In recent years, a debate has commenced regarding the effectiveness of the institutions and their role. The 
disharmony between the stated objectives and the practical implementation of programs has led to contradictions and inconsistent 
policies. This paper will examine the problems and challenges faced by the Bretton Woods institutions in the contemporary 
globalized world. 
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1. INTRODUCTION   
 
After the end of World War II, Liberalism was consolidated. It promoted the idea that the international institutions 
could embody roles and assume responsibilities that the states themselves were not capable of implementing. The 
Liberal Institutionalism proposed international cooperation as the solution to the sound operation of the states 
themselves, their harmonious coexistence and substantial cooperation at an international level, which would ensure 
security and peace. These principles were embodied at a political level upon the establishment of the UN and at an 
economic level upon the establishment of the Bretton Woods Institutions (Voutsa 2012b). 
However, a gradual shift has begun taking place in the theoretical positioning of the Bretton Woods 
Institutions since the 1970s. During that time, the IMF lost one of its basic functions when the system of fixed 
exchange rates (but potentially changeable, by agreement) collapsed and was replaced by floating exchange rates. 
In 1971, the US abandoned the convertibility of the dollar into gold along with the system of the Bretton 
Woods’ fixed exchange rates. The World Bank expanded its range of activities and the IMF became an integral part 
of the developmental process. The interweaving of the relations between the two institutions in conjunction with the 
deviations from their founding principles led to the conclusion that their operation from the mid-1970s and on 
cannot be interpreted through the theory of the Liberal Institutionalism, but through the World-Systems Theory 
instead (Voutsa 2012b).  
Since that time, the effectiveness of the institutions has been repeatedly questioned. Especially the 
interventions by the IMF have received fierce criticism to such an extent that some people advocate that the 
interventions of the institutions exacerbate the crises by creating more side effects in the states in which they 
intervene. 
What is for sure is that globalization affects the operation of the Bretton Woods Institutions. The results of 
the options and policies they promote are not confined to the countries these are implemented. As economies are 
now largely interconnected, the policies applied to a Member may have catalytic effects on global economic 
developments. A typical example is the crisis in Southeast Asia which triggered social riots in the region and it is 
estimated to have resulted in a global yield reduced by 2 billion $ (United Nations Development Programme 1994). 
In the present paper we will try to investigate what the problems are and what challenges are faced by the 
Bretton Woods institutions in today's globalized environment and how this environment affects and differentiates 
the very operation of the institutions. 
 
2. THE ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES OF GLOBALIZATION 
 
The current form of globalization differs substantially from the previous ones since it displays dense and multiple 
weaves of interconnectivity characterized by an unprecedented institutionalization. This dense globalization 
involves a powerful systemic framework that shapes the parameters and limits of the state power. 
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An influential role in the organization process of the global system is played by the Bretton Woods 
Institutions, which are considered to be important driving forces of globalization and the agreements made under 
their framework of operation affect its process and content. 
In the postwar economic system the preferential agreements between Members were replaced by the 
multilateral relations based on the principle of non-discrimination and safeguarded by rules of law that were 
developed within the framework of international institutions. This fact led to a rapid development of organizational 
activity. 
Liberalism promoted the idea that international institutions would be able to embody roles and assume 
responsibilities that the States were not able to implement. This resulted in the transfer of power from the States to 
the international institutions, creating shady world governance that acted and regulated alongside the public 
authorities, especially in the economic sector. The transfer of national tools control to supranational institutions and 
the predominance of market forces over politics have had serious consequences on democracy and the legitimacy of 
governments. 
Influential decisions are taken and often implemented by these external actors, resulting in a constant and –
relatively- ongoing privatization and denationalization of power. Gradually, the power is organized and exercised by 
super-national institutions and from a distance, so that the power subjects and the power objects are distant from 
each other. One such example is the policies cultivated by the Bretton Woods institutions and implemented through 
their programs in any region of the planet without the substantial participation of local agents. 
Along with the increase of interdependence, the distribution of power and authority has become more 
diverse while, at the same time, global governance mechanisms have mushroomed. The state seems to be assuming 
a new role, that of the ombudsman, taking over the interconnection between different spheres of influence and 
domestic as well as international interests. 
The democratic legitimacy of the cluster of global governance is meager, as many issues that create 
accumulated inequality can be traced. There are nations and groups with a larger share in power or in its 
management since they have access to decision making centers and are, thus, more influential. 
What is considered to be a crucial problem is the restricted confinement of democratic practice in the 
current global conditions. The question of democratic legitimacy is twofold. On the one hand, decision making takes 
place in global institutions and organizations which lack democratic legitimacy. The power distribution system is 
not democratic in the Bretton Woods institutions, so their legitimacy remains meager as the state representatives do 
not have direct democratic legitimacy from the majority within the states.  
On the other hand, the implementation of decisions, which are taken outside states in their interior sets 
restrictions on the exercise of domestic policy and questions the democratic processes within states (Table 1, 2). 
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 Table 2: The subscriptions and the votes of the eleven most powerful states in the IBRD 
MEMBER STATE 
TOTAL SUBSCRIPTIONS VOTING POWER 
AMOUNT* 
 
PERCENT OF TOTAL 
(%) 
NUMBERS OF 
VOTES  
PERCENT OF TOTAL 
(%) 
France 7.369,5 4,41 73,945 4,31 
Germany 8.245,0 4,94 82,700 4,82 
United Kingdom 7.369,5 4,41 73,945 4,31 
USA 26.496,9 15,87 265,219 15,45 
Japan 15.840,4 9,49 158,654 9,24 
India 5.055,2 3,03 50,802 2,96 
Italy 4.479,5 2,68 45,045 2,62 
Canada 5.270,9 3,16 52,959 3,09 
China 5.886,4 3,53 59,114 3,44 
Russia 4.479,5 2,68 45,045 2,62 
Saudi Arabia 4.479,5 2,68 45,045 2,62 
Total 94.972,3 56.88 952,473 55.48 
 
      * In million US dollars of 1944. 
Source: The World Bank, Boards of Director, Voting Powers, IBRD Subscriptions and Voting Power of Member Countries, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/278027-1215524804501/IBRDCountryVotingTable.pdf,  processing & 
calculation Voutsa (2015). 
 
 
Table 1: The SDR and the votes of the ten most powerful countries in the IMF 
MEMBER 
STATE 
MILLION OF 
SDRs 
PERCENT OF TOTAL 
SDRs (%) 
NUMBERS OF 
VOTES 
PERCENT OF TOTAL 
VOTES (%) 
France 10.738,5 4,51 108.126 4,29 
Germany 14.565,5 6,12 146.396 5,81 
China 9.525,9 4,00 96.000 3,81 
Japan 15.628,5 6,57 157.026 6,23 
Russia 5.945,4 2,50 60.195 2,39 
Saudi Arabia 6.985,5 2,94 70.596 2,80 
United Kingdom 10.738,5 4,51 108.126 4,29 
USA  42.122,4 17,70 421.965 16,75 
Italy 7.882,3 3,31 79.564 3,16 
Canada 6.369,2 2,68 64.433 2,56 
Total 130.501,7 54,84 1.312.427 52,09 
Source: IMF, IMF Members' Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors, 
www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.htm#2, processing & calculation Voutsa (2015). 
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3. THE ROLE OF THE BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS IN THE MODERN GLOBALIZED 
ENVIRONMENT   
The 1970s marked a series of catalytic global changes that took place in the field of economy. These changes along with the 
process of transformation have been described as a transition from the state to the market. Although the description is not 
incorrect, it is incomplete and unilateral, which may lead to an impression of total submittal of the state to the implemented 
policies. 
This ascertainment would be misleading as it is not an autonomization of the economy over policy but a conscious 
assignment of responsibilities and powers to the private sector and the market. This assignment starts by changing the economic 
model applied and may have multiple forms. 
Until the late 1970s, the economic policy adopted in all the developed capitalist countries, with individual 
differentiations and variations, was directly influenced by the -liberal- Keynesianism. 
 The oil crises that broke out in the 1970s signaled the gradual decline of the economic model applied postwar. The 
course followed led public regulation towards privatization from the state to the market. This change was mainly expressed in 
two ways. On the one hand, the state was demoted from regulator and designer of various policies, claiming budgetary shortfalls 
and the subsequent funding weakness leaving, thus,  more room for private initiative. On the other hand, more and more private 
economic criteria for its operation and evaluation began to be adopted in the implementation of public policies. The financial 
resources were shifted from the state budget and taxation to citizens who are now recognized as consumers of services- products 
which are financed by personal choices and individual investments. 
In essence, however, the new system was limited to certain forms of privatization without proceeding to full 
deregulation and privatization. In its full implementation,  monetarism would have to lead to a reality in which the financing 
resources of state policies would not come from the state budget but from the market instead. In fact, this was not the case. The 
state was not replaced as a distribution mechanism by the market, government interventions do not cease, the state does not 
shrink. The state is not subordinate to the market, but it gives the impression that it actually subsides for the benefit of the market, 
mediating between the society and the market. 
To a large extent, the state keeps financing various sectors such as health and education not directly in the form of 
social benefits, but through the mediation of the market and the businesses which operate as intermediate management stations 
and exploiters of resources. With the a priori assumption that the private sector is more productive and effective than the state 
one, what is granted is the indirect or direct management of public systems (e.g. education, health) to the private sector which is 
paid by the state for the services it provides. 
The theory of monetarism served as a ‘scientific alibi’ in order to change the existing economic model that led to the 
establishment not of monetarism but to the principles of neoliberalism. The type of social consensus that was introduced with 
Keynesianism was also used as an argument to change the economic model of macroeconomic policy. 
The resource allocation mechanism does not seem to be replaced but rather  substituted in the decision-making 
processes of a diversified model that draws its origin from the market and presents itself as more rational. The state imposes 
private-economy criteria in its manner of operation and allows for the intrusion of market terms in the decisions it takes. It 
behaves like a quasi-market for the benefit of the market which in most cases is not as impersonal as it is appears to be. 
The policies followed by the Bretton Woods institutions consolidate the image analyzed above. The Bretton Woods 
institutions have played a catalytic role in spreading the principles of neoliberalism through the policies they promote. With the 
‘conditionalities’ they set in their financial programs, they actually force countries to adopt similar policies, leaving room for the 
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private sector to intrude in state policies. By means of the subsidies and guarantees they provide to private investments as well as 
by providing incentives for private-public sector collaboration and the privatizations they promote, these institutions lead to the 
dominance of large companies and consultants who exploit the profits arising from the special role reserved for them. 
The IFC and MIGA encourage individuals to invest, ensuring compensation to companies for any losses in case the 
governments of developing countries cancel their agreements. Similarly, the IFC offers financial support to for-profit companies 
wishing to commence or expand activities in the markets of public services (Voutsa at al 2014). 
 
4. THE COURSE OF THE BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS FROM THEIR 
ESTABLISHMENT UP TO NOW  
 
It was as early as the 1950s that the IMF used the power conferred by the Articles of Agreement (Article IV) in order to exercise 
supervision in the exchange rate policy of its member states. Gradually, however, from the 1980s and on, it strengthened its audit 
function by imposing on its borrowing countries ‘conditionalities’, beyond their lending terms, concerning the implementation of 
certain macroeconomic and other policies. As a result, the loans granted were accompanied by the imposition of 
‘conditionalities’, whose feasibility and effectiveness has been questioned (Voutsa, 2011).   
 This development is directly related to the rejection of statism and the implementation of the free market and the New 
Political Economy (NPE) model. The NPE advocates that if market mechanisms are to be released from policy interventions, 
they may act as competent regulators for the successful operation of the economic system. As a consequence, the state was 
viewed as the problem of development and the free market appeared to be the solution, while up to that point the institutions had 
been operating in the light of detecting market imperfections and guiding governments so as to improve them (Voutsa, 2011).
 The new economic doctrine was summarized under the term ‘Washington consensus’ and its philosophy was based on 
three principles: a. Privatization, b. Liberalization, c. Macroeconomic stability. From the mid 1990s and on, the position of the 
‘Washington consensus’ was taken over by the ‘Washington post-consensus’, which does not substantially differ in terms of 
content but works additively with more reference points (Table 3).  
 
Table 3: The key points of 'Washington consensus' and the supplementary  elements of 'Post-Washington consensus'  
WASHINGTON CONSENSUS POST-WASHINGTON CONSENSUS 
  
1. Fiscal discipline 11. Corporate governance 
 
2. Reorientation of public expenditure 12. Anti-corruption 
3. Tax reform 
 
13. . Flexible labour markets 
4. Financial liberalisation and reduction of interest rates 14. Adherence to WTO disciplines 
 
5. Unified and competitive exchange 15. Non-intermediate exchange rate regimes 
6. Trade liberalisation 16. Independent central banks/inflation targeting 
7. Openness to IFD  17."Prudent" capital-account opening 
8. Privatisation 
 
18. Social safety nets 
9. Deregulation 19. Targeted poverty reduction 
10. Secure Property Rights 20. Adherence to international financial codes and 
standards 
 
Source: Voutsa 2011. 
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 5. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POLICIES EMBRACED BY THE BRETTON WOODS 
INSTITUTIONS 
 
  The programs implemented by the Bretton Woods institutions present specific core characteristics (Voutsa 2012a): 
 
1. Persistence in a market model by imposing certain ‘conditionalities’ 
 The main feature of the programs is to impose ‘conditionalities’. In a joint review of the IMF and the World Bank (2001-
02), they raised the question of aligning all financial benefits and financing strategies, wherever these come from, with specific 
‘conditionalities’, which are included in the ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper’. 
 Besides the fact that the ‘conditionalities’ exhibit a particular almost unalterable form in all programs of the institutions, 
they also lead to a specific model of ‘market economy’. Instead of intervening in order to assist those countries in the specific 
problems they are facing, they always attempt a structural transformation of the economy. To that end, they exert pressure on 
borrowing countries to proceed to ‘second generation’ reforms and the ‘conditionalities’ are extended to areas that belong to the 
spheres of politics, governance systems, management of public goods and public administration. 
 In this way, the institutions assign themselves an entirely new mission, deviating from their original and declared 
objectives, and consolidate their leading role in shaping the internal policies of the states by means of implementing more 
‘conditionalities’ that target to other areas beyond the purely economic ones. 
 In reality, there is no market economy whatsoever. Canada, the US, Japan, France, Germany and Sweden are modern, 
developed capitalist states with an established market economy, though it is not embodied in their operation and authorities in the 
same way. Some states, such as Canada and Sweden, have more developed social welfare and protection systems while others, 
like the US, have less developed ones. Similar comparisons could also be made to many issues, proving that in fact there is no 
single successful free-market model. 
 
2.Conditionalities for the means and not the objectives of the programs 
What plays a dominant role in the agenda of the institutions is to promote a particular model of ‘market economy’. This 
ascertainment is confirmed by the fact that the ‘conditionalities’ set in countries and the evaluation of their programs are not 
made on the basis of the objectives and the results of the programs, but rather on the means and the faithful implementation of the 
‘conditionalities’ regardless of their efficiency. 
The Bretton Woods institutions confuse the program objectives with the means to achieve them, as the financing 
‘conditionalities’ are related to the measures to be taken by countries and not to the results of the policies implemented. At the 
same time, the evaluation of the measures taken is not based on their effectiveness, but on their alignment with the ‘sacred 
doctrines’ of the institutions. That is to say, the ‘conditionalities’ are not linked to the expected results of the implemented 
policies but to the technical implementation of specific parameters instead. 
Rather than monitoring the progress on the indices dealing with the implemented macroeconomic policy, audit is 
usually conducted on the means of materializing the objectives or on meeting very strict timetables. 
What seems to be lacking so as to successfully connect the internal logical connection between strategy/tools and the 
desired result is the development of a ‘political economy of institutional reforms’ (Girishankar, 2001), which should take into 
account not only the technocratic knowledge of the various impasses that arise in the area of institutions, but also the inevitable 
involvement of politics in making reforms. 
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3. ‘The nirvana fallacy’      
 The Bretton Woods institutions argue that the design and implementation of financial programs can be made more 
effective without the participation of local agents. This perception has been called ‘the Nirvana fallacy’. The institutions, 
ignoring the special characteristics which should be taken into consideration, shape policies and tools which are not designed 
properly so as to operate and be applicable to the particular environment of each country. This practice makes it difficult to 
implement the financial policies, as for their successful implementation the commitment of a state is not sufficient; what is also 
needed is a wider framework of cooperation that cannot be attained without meaningful dialogue, which is absent in most 
programs. 
The absence of a strong social contract, which would act as a breakwater against the turbulences of transformation assisting 
the sound operation of countries, caused irreparable damage to the social capital of countries. 
 
4.The ‘infallibility’ syndrome   
 The institutions face countries as tabula rasa, completely ignoring the ‘initial conditions’ on which the proposed measures 
should be implemented while placing emphasis unilaterally on the economic aspects of the programs. Bailout programs give 
priority to repaying creditors rather than aiding the countries and maintaining  balance in the world economy. 
The institutions seem to be bound by a particular ideology that deprives countries from alternatives they should have at their 
disposal. The model implemented creates a teleological perception around the materialization and the results of the programs. 
States are obliged to implement a specific process in a uniform manner, as a sine qua non condition, which in theory leads to the 
sound operation of the market and to economic growth as well. Experience has shown that the attitude of the Bretton Woods 
institutions in many cases has been ineffective but they remained intransigent. 
However, the Bretton Woods institutions do not discuss the uncertainties associated with the policies they propose as they 
try to project the image of infallibility. This attitude does not allow institutions to learn from past mistakes. Some minor 
assumptions made by institutions for mistakes committed in the past do not change the overall picture. 
For example, the IMF never revised its models which systematically underestimate the depth of recessions neither its 
policies that are too restrictive. 
 
 6. GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS 
 
The technocratic outlook of the programs and the excessive confidence in the effectiveness of financial tools seem to constitute 
the dominant idea of the policies promoted. The mentality of the institutions is directly related to the mentality of the major 
shareholders as well as the voting rights of the member-states. 
The institutions do not only deal with technical issues and arrangements. Their actions affect the lives of billions of 
people, although they do not answer to anyone for their actions. The influence of the institutions is exerted in periods of crises 
and only on countries with less power and economic problems. The strong states which act as creditors to the rest of the world 
can ignore the recommendations of the institutions.  
Taking advantage of their institutional role through processes and interconnections that extend beyond the limits of 
their powers to issues concerning the structure and operation of the global economic and financial system, the institutions enforce 
and promote specific policies. A disharmony can be traced between the proclaimed, initial objectives of the institutions and the 
real ones. The initial objective is to maintain global financial stability. Today, the institutions seem to serve the financial interests 
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which are directly linked to the strength of powerful states. This imbalance leads to a lack of coherence between the programs 
and the rhetoric of the institutions.          
The Bretton Woods institutions are systematically trying to displace the political element from their programs and 
decisions. With the excuse that politics distorts the economy and bears negative impacts on the sound operation of markets, they 
are constantly trying to detach the economic decisions from the political processes.     
 However, they tend to forget that what will eventually be implemented and the strategic directions that will be given do 
not depend on a supernatural and politically neutral authority, but on the crucial process of distributing interests and allocating 
power both within states and in the international geopolitical arena. Therefore, ‘someone’ will always determine ‘what’ the 
policies shall serve. This ‘someone’ will cultivate, project and eventually implement a specific education policy which will serve 
the dominant ideology and the dominant correlation of powers in the best possible way. This ‘someone’ that determines ‘what’ 
acquires the necessary ideological legitimizing power (Voutsa at al 2014). 
With the escalating domination of commodity logic in shaping all policies, what is merely differentiated is ‘who’ 
decides on ‘what’ whereas the power that changes hands remains the same at its core. In fact, all the traditional stakes-political, 
cultural, economic, social ones- which have been preoccupying the policies of states, remain almost unchanged, with the only 
difference that their evaluation is redefined and set on a new basis, that of maximizing economic benefit (Voutsa at al 2014). 
A change is needed in the mentality of the institutions, which cannot take place unless the power correlations within the 
institutions change as well. The voting rights and the representation of countries play an important role in the process and a 
change in the governance of institutions is imperative if they wish to have a minimum solvency. The allocation of its seats and 
shares should represent the modern economic correlations and reflect the position of emerging economies so as to enhance the 
legitimacy of the institution. 
 
7. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A MORE EFFECTIVE OPERATION OF THE INSTITUTIONS  
 
7.1. The International Monetary Fund   
  
1. Liberalization of Capitals           
 The IMF has promoted the policy of deregulation which concerns the liberalization of capital and financial markets. 
This liberalization has catalytically contributed to the birth and spread of crises throughout the world. That is because the capitals 
flow into a country when there is economic growth and outflow during a recession, i.e. when the economy needs support. This 
increases pressures and strengthens the destabilization of countries especially in times of crisis. The liberalization of capital 
markets and short-term capital flows may cause enormous pressures on countries. Even the IMF itself in one of its reports admits 
that ‘A few papers find a positive effect of financial integration on growth. However, the majority find no effect or at best a mixed 
effect. Thus, an objective reading of the vast research effort to date suggests that there is no strong, robust and uniform support 
for the theoretical argument that financial globalization per se delivers a higher rate of economic growth’ (Prasad at al 2003).
 Despite the ascertainment that there is no strong evidence to confirm that the liberalization of capital markets does not 
always enhance the growth rates, the IMF continues to push countries towards this direction. The IMF should review the process 
of liberalization of the capital flow and the repercussions they have especially on countries with anonymous economies. 
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2. Bankruptcy and Payment Freeze          
The problems of defaulting public debt are complicated both in terms of their management and their solution. It is, 
however, imperative that the IMF reassess its attitude towards bankruptcy procedures and the ability of countries to proceed to 
freezing payments to their creditors. That way, there will be less reliance on bailout programs which fail as these often aim at 
protecting creditors and imposing on countries friendly arrangements on debt repayment to lenders. Alongside, the bailout 
programs in some cases exacerbate the problems as they reduce incentives in order to draw more attention to borrowing and 
hedging foreign currency risks. The issue of the moral responsibility of creditors remains very important as they have repeatedly 
borrowed in a reckless manner. Certainly, the role of the IMF in this process remains complicated and the institution itself is a 
creditor to countries. So, in these cases what should be found is another way to manage processes. 
 
3. More effective reaction to crises          
In some instances the reaction of the IMF to the crises arising has not been effective. A typical example is the 
Southeast Asia crisis in 1997. The design of the programs is inadequate and their materialization does not take into account the 
specific conditions in each country and the social and economic impacts that may arise from the implementation of the programs. 
Although the IMF predictions are often wrong, the institution does not differentiate its models, nor does it admit its liability in 
case of failures. In many cases, the conditionalities it sets plunge the countries into a vicious circle of recession and lead to 
greater economic suffocation. The IMF should return to its original objectives and focus on providing assistance to countries in 
order to restore their economy. 
 
7.2. The World Bank  
 
1.  Minimization of ‘conditionalities’  
 The imposition of ‘conditionalities’ by the World Bank, which may well enter the political sphere is often unhelpful to 
the effectiveness of its programs. Countries should be able to choose their own economic strategies and their pillars of 
development. The participation of local actors is essential for creating goodwill through finance. When countries have no further 
choices and have no say in the program compilation process due to the supernumerary ‘conditionalities’ that have been set, it 
jeopardizes the success of the programs themselves. 
 The programs implemented by the WB mainly on developing countries as well as the theoretical framework of 
programs creates a surrounding atmosphere. The Bretton Woods institutions promote the priorities policy through complex 
‘conditionalities’ which concern measures taken to aid and relieve debt for poor countries. A 2006 survey found that out of 20 
countries which received loans from the WB and the IMF, privatization was a conditionality in 18 of them, while the same survey 
indicated that in the debt deletion programs some form of privatization was associated with ‘Conditionalities’ for more than half 
the countries which, anyway, met the conditions for their participation in the program (Voutsa at al 2014). 
 
2. Targeted assistance          
When countries feel that the reforms imposed on them are not related to their real needs, the proper environment for the 
success of the programs and the development of countries is not created. Assistance should focus on the areas that the states 
mostly need, such as education and health programs. Small amounts of well designed programs and coordination can bring about 
great changes in countries and their development. 
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3. Debt write-off            
In some cases it is necessary to write off the debts of some countries. There are examples in which the loans were not 
directed to cover the real needs but they were used for political reasons. A well-known case is that of Mobutu, commander of 
Congo, who was given money to keep the country in the Western camp (Stiglitz 2006). In these cases there should be total debt 
write-off so as not to keep burdening the citizens with the repayment of amounts given to serve the interests of major 
shareholders of the institutions. It was before 2000 that an initiative for partial debt write-down of certain countries was launched. 
But the effort should be expanded and the relief of loan obligations should be further extended so as not to relate only to certain 
very poor countries. 
 
 8. CONCLUSIONS  
 The Bretton Woods agreement was a major achievement of the institutional innovation and organization which 
constituted a system governing the global economy. The ‘compromise of embedded liberalism’ (Ruggie 1982) advanced the 
Bretton Woods towards globalization, as it contributed to economic development, security and stability. This compromise 
allowed for the exercise of globalized policies which, though, did not leave room for countries to exert an autonomous policy 
tailored to their internal needs. 
 Gradually, however, from the 1970s and on the deconstruction of this edifice commenced and changed the philosophy 
of the institutions. The programs of the institutions did no longer promote globalized policies with local characteristics but, 
instead, they  promoted hyper-globalized policies with uniform characteristics. 
 Nowadays, most Bretton Woods institutions are developing and promoting programs with specific targeting which has 
to be accommodated with specific measures, without margins to choose differentiated policies. What is imposed is a common 
line that penetrates the core of all areas determined by the actions of institutions. The concepts of development and economic 
prosperity have been linked to the limitation of the welfare state, the tight fiscal policy, the small public sector, privatizations and 
the deregulation of markets. Similar values are conditioning the non-economic policies pursued by the institutions. The programs 
are subordinate to these principles and each country must follow them regardless of its specificities and the initial conditions 
prevailing it. 
 In an axiomatic manner and through Manichean approaches, the institutions deny the existence of different means of 
achieving objectives and the means are converted into an end in themselves. The countries financed are obliged to follow a 
particular package of measures in order to continue to have access to the funds. This leads to a reality where non-state institutions 
decide and enforce policy measures that are implemented within the member states in various sectors. 
 Therefore, what emerges to the surface is the issue of the legitimacy of policies leading to hyper-globalization, as they 
come from non-state centers and lack direct democratic legitimacy. This reality sets us before a fundamental trilemma that could 
be called political triangle of incompatibility. This equation involves the nation state, the democratic policies and hyper-
globalization. These three parameters cannot coexist simultaneously. The combination can only be achieved with two parameters. 
That is, democracy, national sovereignty and economic hyper-globalization cannot be promoted at the same time. Since the 
nation-state remains the main form of organization, we must decide whether it will be combined with democratic policies or 
huper-globalization (Rodrik 2012). 
 If what is desired is the combination of the nation state with hyper-globalization, we must accept the ‘Golden 
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Straitjacket’ coined by Tom Friedman (Rodrik 2012). That is to say, we should be reconciled with the existence of a nation-state 
that is in fact neither a nation nor a state, at least not in the way we perceive it today. The only concern of this formation would 
be the promotion of huper-globalization by aligning all domestic policies with the international standards that would be defined 
by market forces or by entities of reduced democratic legitimacy. 
 According to Friedman (2012, 104-106) investors and speculators carrying billions in any part of the planet with the 
touch of a button oblige the states to wear a ‘Golden Straitjacket’. This ‘Golden Straitjacket’ is the garment of deep globalization 
and is composed of deregulations which the states are forced to comply with. Free markets, free trade, flexible working relations, 
small public sectors are some of the threads that make up the ‘Golden Straitjacket’ which as soon as you wear ‘your economy 
will grow and your policy will shrink’. Today, this view seems too optimistic in relation to its economic benefits and, by 
experience, the part concerning the development has yet to be confirmed. 
 Globalization does not constitute a process of exceeding the powers and activities of the state, but it is conducive to the 
transformation of a globalized state. It does not eradicate it but remodels it. The states are not dissolved but alter their 
functionality, undertake new roles and responsibilities and barter away some others, expanding or shrinking their powers in each 
case separately. 
 The choices we have within the capitalist system are finite and confront us with specific restrictions that require 
difficult compromises. Once we realize that we are obligated make specific choices, we will have the opportunity to expand 
dialogue towards improving the conditions and the framework for action, implementation and expansion of the existing system 
and the Bretton Woods institutions. 
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